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Equilibrium Outcomes in Two-Stage Amendment 
Procedures* 
Jeffrey S. Banks, University of Rochester 
This paper analyzes the set of sophisticated voting outcomes under the following two-stage 
amendment procedure: the set of alternatives is partitioned into two subsets; one subset is voted on 
via an amendment procedure at the first stage, followed by the remaining subset at the second stage. 
The surviving alternatives are then paired at the final vote. This procedure is related to that used in 
congressional decision making when both a bill and a substitute bill are in order on the floor and 
hence are open to amendments. It is shown that it is "easier" for alternatives initially considered at 
the second stage to be the outcome of the voting game than those considered at the first stage. The set 
of outcomes is contrasted with that generated by the (one-stage) amendment procedure as well as the 
concept of the uncovered set. 
The impact of voting procedures and agendas on the outcomes of collective 
decision problems has recently become the subject of substantial research by so-
cial scientists (see Ordeshook and Schwartz, 1987, and the citations therein). 
This interest can be seen as deriving from the larger program of analyzing the 
influence that institutional structures have in determining the outcomes of voting 
processes; the greater the influence, the greater the amount of "power" held by 
those in control of these institutional arrangements relative to those deciding at 
the voting stage of the process. Much of the work on voting procedures and agen-
das has focused on the amendment voting procedure, where two alternatives are 
put to a vote, the winner being paired with a new alternative, the winner of that 
then paired against a new alternative, and so on (Miller, 1980; Shepsle and 
Weingast, 1984; Banks, 1985). This procedure is attractive for a number of rea-
sons, not the least of which is that it is consistent with the rules in Congress 
governing the perfecting of a bill through a series of amendments to the bill 
(Roberts' Rules). 
Ordeshook and Schwartz (1987) rightly point out, however, that the amend-
ment voting procedure is only one type, and not necessarily the most prevalent 
type, of procedure employed by voting bodies such as Congress. They cite the 
work of congressional scholars in establishing the fact that any number of vot-
ing procedures are used in formulating a collective decision. Ordeshook and 
Schwartz then proceed to show that, given the ability to choose any type of 
voting procedure, those in charge of such decisions have virtually complete con-
trol over the outcome, in that nearly every alternative is the outcome of some 
procedure and agenda. However, while these results are helpful in establishing 
upper bounds on the influence of those who decide on procedures and agendas, 
Ordeshook and Schwartz do not present any evidence concerning whether the 
procedure they analyze that generates these bounds (i.e., the successive elimina-
*I would like to thank David Austen-Smith, Barry Weingast, and two anonymous referees for 
valuable comments and suggestions. 
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Jeffrey S. Banks 
tion procedure) is a prevalent or feasible method of decision making in an organi-
zation such as Congress. 
A common area of interest to those who study the effects of voting proce-
dures and agendas is the relevance to the processes by which bills before the U.S. 
Congress become amended prior to a vote on final passage. If a bill is reported 
out of a committee under an "open rule," members of Congress have the oppor-
tunity to propose changes in the bill and to have these changes put to a vote. Both 
houses of Congress have well-defined rules governing the process by which a bill 
can be amended, based on the timing and nature of the changes considered. For 
instance, Rule 19 in the House of Representatives defines "the basic pattern of 
consideration" for amending a bill on the floor (Sullivan, 1984, p. 32). It states 
that "when a motion or proposition is under consideration a motion to amend and 
a motion to amend that amendment shall be in order, and it shall also be in order 
to offer a further amendment by way of a substitute, to which one amendment 
may be offered, but which shall not be voted on until the original matter is per-
fected" (qtd. in Sullivan, 1984). The "amendment by way of a substitute" can 
simply be considered a substitute bill. Later decisions have modified this rule to 
allow for substitute amendments to a bill, as well as giving the substitute bill 
equal status with the original bill in terms of the degree to which it can be 
amended. The order in which the bill and its substitute are considered is still the 
same, however; that is, the original bill is perfected prior to the perfecting of the 
substitute bill. For example, suppose that on the floor of the House there are the 
following seven alternatives to the status quo: an unamended bill (b), the bill 
perfected by an amendment (ba), the bill perfected by an amended amendment 
(baa), the bill perfected by a substitute amendment (bs), an unamended sub-
stitute bill (s), the substitute bill perfected by an amendment (sa), and the sub-
stitute bill perfected by an amended amendment (saa). Then the decision pro-
cedure, according to Rule 19 and its precedents, is as follows (Sullivan, 1984 ): 
(1) ba versus baa (whether to amend the amendment); (2) the winner at 1 versus 
bs (whether to substitute for the perfected amendment); (3) the winner at 2 versus 
b (whether to amend the bill); (4) sa versus saa (whether to amend the amend-
ment for the substitute bill); (5) the winner at 4 versus s (whether to amend the 
substitute); (6) the winner at 5 versus the winner at 3 (whether to replace the 
perfected bill by the perfected substitute bill). In the Senate the process of amend-
ing a bill can be quite similar to that of the House. As an example, Bach (1983) 
describes the case of S. 7, the Veteran's Health Care Amendments of 1979. Prior 
to a vote there were six alternatives to the status quo pending (using the same 
shorthand as above): b, ba, bs, s, sa, saa. The procedure would be (1) ba versus 
bs; (2) the winner at 1 vs. b; (3) sa versus saa; (4) the winner at 3 versus s; and 
(5) the winner at 4 versus the winner at 2. The resulting bill would then be put to 
a vote against the status quo. 
In both of the above examples, the following structure is present in the 
voting process: the set of alternatives (excluding the status quo) is partitioned 
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TWO-STAGE AMENDMENT PROCEDURES 27 
into two subsets, namely, those referring to the original bill (including the bill 
itself) and those referring to the substitute bill. In the first stage of voting, an 
amendment procedure is employed to perfect the original bill, followed by a sec-
ond stage in which the substitute bill is perfected via the amendment procedure. 
Finally, the perfected bill is paired with the perfected substitute to determine the 
final content of the bill. Thus, a specification of this type of procedure, which we 
label the two-stage amendment procedure, requires (I) a partition of the alter-
natives into two subsets and (2) a pair of agendas, or orderings of the alternatives 
in each subset for consideration via an amendment procedure. This procedure is 
analyzed in detail in the following sections of the paper. Section 1 contains the 
necessary hardware for the subsequent analysis, while section 2 reviews the re-
sults to date on the outcomes under an amendment procedure. Section 3 exam-
ines the two-stage amendment procedure described above, and section 4 extends 
this analysis to the case where the agenda on the subset considered second is a 
function of the outcome from the subset considered first. Finally, section 5 con-
cludes with a summary of the results, a discussion of their relevance to the study 
of voting procedures, and some comments on further research. 
Notation, Definitions, Assumptions 
Let X be a finite set of alternatives, JxJ = m, N the set of voters, JNJ = n 
odd, and assume that each voter is endowed with a strict preference order P, C X 
x X. Let D(X) be the set of all subsets of X. The majority preference relation P 
C X x X is defined by 
xPy iff J{i E N : xP,y}J > n/2. 
The assumptions above imply that the relation P is complete and asymmetric; 
that is, V x, y EX, either xPy or yPx. In what follows we restrict attention to the 
majority preference relation rather than the underlying individual preference re-
lations; by McGarvey (1953) any majority preference relation can be generated 
by an appropriate specification of individual preferences. Define the function 
P: X-'> D(X) by 
P(x) = {y E X : yPx}, 
analogously define 
p- 1(x) = {y E X : xPy} 
and set 
P(x) = P- 1(x) U {x}. 
We extend the majority preference relation over X to a relation over D(X) as 
follows: define C5JJ C D(X) x D(X) by 
SC!!JT iff S, TE D(X) and Vy E T 3 x E S such that xPy. 
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28 Jeffrey S. Banks 
Since the relation P was complete, the relation <lil will be as well, although not 
necessarily asymmetric. This relation is analogous to the "external stability" 
property of von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in that every alternative in the 
complement of the set is "beaten" by some alternative in the set. For any integer 
k > 1, define the relation <lil k C il(X) x il(X) recursively by 
S<lilkT iff 3 WE il(X) such that S<lilW and Wqj)HT. 
Thus, if S<lil kT then V y E T there exists a k-step path via the relation P from 
some x E Stoy. Define the subrelation <lilm C il(X) X il(X), by 
S<lilmT iff S<lilT and V x ES 3 y E T s.t. xPy and yPz, V z E S\{x}. 
Alternatively, S<lil m T if S<lil T and for no S' C Sis it that S'<lil T. Finally, define the 
relation C C X x X by 
xCy iff {x}<lilP(y). 
This "covering" relation defines a strict partial order on the set X. Miller (1980), 
Shepsle and Weingast (1984), and McKelvey (1986) have examined the set of 
maximal elements of this relation, the uncovered set U(X), as a solution concept 
to a number of different game forms. Miller (1980) has shown that this set can be 
characterized by the following: 
THEOREM 1 (Miller, 1980): x E U(X) iff {x}<lil 2X\{x}. 
Thus, alternatives in U(X) can, in two steps, "reach" any other alternative in X 
via the relation P. In subsequent sections we shall see how the solution sets of the 
various procedures are related to the set U(X). 
The class of binary voting procedures we wish to examine can be character-
ized as occurring on a binary voting tree f = (A, Q; 1/J), where (1) (A, Q) is a 
topological tree; that is, A is a set of "nodes" with unique initial node A0 E A, 
and Q is an asymmetric acyclic binary relation on A with at most one path be-
tween any two nodes, thus describing the "branches" of the tree; (2) 1/J : N ~ X 
is an onto function assigning to each terminal node A E N C A an alternative 
from X; and (3) each nonterminal node is immediately followed by exactly two 
nodes. Nonterminal nodes correspond to decision nodes at which a vote is taken 
between two alternatives, these alternatives being the branches to the next nodes. 
For all A E A \{A 0} let p(A) be the alternative in X associated with the branch 
immediately preceding A, and for all nonterminal nodes A E A \N let f(A) be the 
subtree starting from A with assignment 1/J;. derived from the original assignment 
1/J. All of the procedures analyzed below give rise to voting trees which are uni-
form, so that the number of decisions required to reach any two terminal nodes is 
the same, and nonrepetitive, so that this number is precisely m - 1 (Ordeshook 
and Schwartz, 1987, provide these and other classifications of binary proce-
dures). For all A, A' EA \A' we say that the subtrees beginning with A and A' are 
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TWO-STAGE AMENDMENT PROCEDURES 29 
equivalent, f(A) = f(A'), if both subtrees are uniform, of the same length, and 
.P x ( ·) = .P x.C ·). We assume that individuals adopt sophisticated voting strategies, 
so that (1) at the final decision nodes (i.e., those followed by only terminal 
nodes), they vote for the preferred alternative from those associated with the sub-
sequent terminal nodes; (2) at the penultimate decision nodes, they vote for the 
preferred alternative from those derived from the optimizing behavior of the 
voters at the final decision nodes; and so on, back up the voting tree. Thus at each 
decision node we can associate an alternative that will be the ultimate outcome if 
that decision node is reached; label this outcome s(A). The alternative associated 
with the initial decision node, s(A 0), will thus be the equilibrium outcome of the 
game; this outcome we label the sophisticated voting outcome. McKelvey and 
Niemi (1978) have shown that this outcome is unique for any binary voting pro-
cedure based on majority rule. 
We can categorize binary voting procedures by the constraints they place on 
the assignment l/J( ·) where, by the assumption of sophisticated voting, this as-
signment is sufficient to calculate the equilibrium outcome. In the following sec-
tions, however, we shall see that techniques exist for calculating the sophisticated 
voting outcome for the procedures that we examine without recourse to this 
"voting tree" characterization of the procedures. These techniques will then fa-
cilitate the derivation of the set of sophisticated voting outcomes for the proce-
dures. The importance of the voting tree characterizations will be in the identifi-
cation of segments of the procedures that are similar to that which is well known, 
namely, the amendment procedure. The next section summarizes the main results 
of this procedure. 
Amendment Procedures 
An amendment voting procedure has the following format: two alternatives 
are put to a vote, with the winner then facing a new alternative. The winner of 
this vote is paired with another new alternative, and so forth, until all the alter-
natives have been considered in a vote at least once. For example, if X = {x, y, z, 
a, b, c}, then the amendment procedure shown in Figure 1 initially pairs a versus 
b, with the winner paired against c, and so on. 
Given this scenario, we can characterize an amendment procedure by an 
agenda rr : {1, 2, ... , m} ~ X, where rr is a one-one and onto function assign-
ing to each "level" of the procedure an alternative from X. Thus, the first vote is 
between rr(l) and rr(2); the winner faces rr(3); and so forth. In Figure 1 then, 
rr(l) = a, rr(2) = b, and so on. Let Il(X) be the set of all such orderings of the 
set X. If one were to characterize this procedure by a binary voting tree and adopt 
the convention that newly recognized alternatives occupy the right branch follow-
ing a decision node, then the constraint on the assignment .p : N ~ X would be as 
follows: let er = 2 m-I be the number of terminal nodes, so that N = {A 1, A 2 , • 
Au}; then, 
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30 Jeffrey S. Banks 
l/J(A.2) = l/J(A 4) = l/J(A.6) = l/J(As) = · · · = l/J(A.17) 
l/J(A.3) = l/l(A.1) = l/J(A11) = · · · = l/J(Au- 1) 
l/J(A. 5) = l/J(A. 13) = · · · 
l/J(A. 9) = l/J(X. 2s) = · · · 
and so forth. 
Thus in Figure 1 we have that l/J(A. 1) = a, l/J(A. 2) = z, l/J(A. 3) = y, l/J(A. 5) = x, 
l/J(A. 9) = c, and !/{(A 17) = b. In general, the relationship between the ordering 1T 
and the assignment .p is: 
l/J(A. 1) = 7r(l) 
l/J(A. 2) = 1T(m) 
l/J(A. 3) = 1T(m - 1) 
l/J(A. 5) = 1T(m - 2) 
FIGURE I 
An Amendment Procedure and Majority Preference Relation 
a c b c 
a z y zx z y zc z y zx z y zb z y zx z y zc z y zx z y z 
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TWO-STAGE AMENDMENT PROCEDURES 31 
Shepsle and Weingast ( 1984) have developed an algorithm for calculating 
the sophisticated voting outcome for an amendment procedure by simply using 
the "order" characterization of the voting game. This is done by first creating the 
sophisticated agenda z(7T) = {z.(7r), z2(7T), . .. , zm(7T)}, where 
zm(1T) = 1T(m), and\:/ 1 ,s; i < m, 
Z;(7T) = [ 7T(i) if 7T(i) E P(z), \:/ j > i,] 
z,+ 1 else. 
Let v(X, 7T) be the sophisticated voting outcome for the amendment procedure 
characterized by the ordering 1T over X. 
THEOREM 2 (Shepsle and Weingast, 1984): For all 7T E Il(X), v(X, 7T) = 
Z1(7T). 
Suppose in the example in Figure 1 that the majority preference relation cor-
responds to that shown below the voting tree, where y ~ x means that yPx. Then 
the sophisticated agenda is z(7T) = (c, c, c, x, z, z), so that c is the sophisticated 
voting outcome in Figure 1. Hence, there is a convenient method for calculating 
the sophisticated voting outcome in an amendment procedure for any ordering of 
the alternatives . 
Let S 1(X) = rr E~xJ { v(X, 7T)}. The set S 1(X) consists of those alternatives in 
X which are the sophisticated voting outcome in an amendment procedure for 
some ordering 1T of X. This set can be thought of as the "possibility set" when 
the decision on the ordering of the alternatives is being made, conditional on X 
and an amendment procedure being previously chosen. Banks (1985) charac-
terizes this set as follows: for all x E X, let H(x) = {X' E !1(X) : Pis transitive 
on X' and xis P-maximal in X'}. 
THEOREM 3 (Banks , 1985): S 1(X) = {x E X: 3 H E H(x) such that 
Hrz!JX\H}. 
In the above example, a E S 1(X) by the set{a, b}, b E S 1(X) by{b, x, y}, and so 
forth. The only alternative not in S 1(X) is z, since the largest set in H(z) is {z, b, 
y} = P(z), but {a}rz!J{z, b, y}, so that aCz. In general, we have 
THEOREM 4 (Miller, 1980): S 1(X) C U(X). 
Thus, a necessary condition for an alternative to be in S 1(X) is that it not be 
covered by any other alternative in X. 
Although the above analysis was derived only for amendment procedures, 
where an alternative can occupy any level in the agenda, it is a simple exercise to 
extend the analysis to the case where one alternative, x 0 E X, the status quo, is 
always voted on last, so that 1T(m) = x 0. The relevant set of alternatives then 
becomes the set P(x 0), since by the algorithm of Shepsle and Weingast any alter-
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native that does not beat 7T(m) is, in their terms, "innocuous," or irrelevant to the 
computation of the sophisticated voting outcome. Thus, the set of sophisticated 
voting outcomes in this case becomes S 1(P(x 0)) if P(x 0) is nonempty, and it is 
equal to {x0} if P(x 0) is empty. Alternatively, for all x EX define the set H(-; x 0) 
as 
H(x; x0) = {X' E H(x) : min X' = x0}, and then p 
S 1(X; x 0) = {x EX: 3 HE H(x; x 0) such that H<i!JX\H}. 
The following shows that these methods are equivalent. 
THEOREM 5: S1(P(x0)) = S 1(X; x0). 
PROOF: (1) to see: S 1(P(x0)) C S 1(X; x 0). Let X' be such that Theorem 3 
holds for x in P(x 0); then X' U {x0} E H(x; x 0), since X' C P(x 0); and X' U 
{x0}<i!JX\[X' U {x0}], since X'<i!JP(x 0)\X' and {x0}<i!JX\P(x0)\{x0}. (2) To 
see: S 1(X; x 0) C S 1(P(x 0)). Let X' U {x0} be such that Theorem 3 holds for 
x in X; since X'<i!JP(x 0)\X' and the relation P is still linear on X' the result 
follows. QED. 
For instance, in the above example we have that S 1(X; b) ={a, c}, while S 1(X; c) 
= {a}. In subsequent sections we shall ignore the possible presence of status quo 
alternatives, since the above result implies that the inclusion of such alternatives 
poses no analytical problems. 
Two-Stage Amendment Procedures 
In this procedure it is assumed that the set Xis partitioned into X 1 and X 2 , 
where IXjl = m j, and the voting proceeds as follows: two alternatives in X 1 are 
paired; the one receiving the majority of votes is then paired against a new alter-
native from X 1, and so forth. After the m 1 - 1 votes are taken, one alternative 
from X 1 remains, and consideration switches to the set X 2, where again voting 
proceeds via an amendment procedure. After the m 2 - 1 votes are taken on X 2, 
the remaining alternatives from X 1 and X 2 are then paired, with the prevailing 
alternative being declared the outcome. Thus we can characterize this procedure 
by (X2; 7T 1, 7T 2), where X 2 Eil(X),X 1 = X\X 2, and (7T 1, 7T 2) E II(X 1) X Il(X 2) 
order the sets X 1 andX 2• In Figure 2, X 1 = {a, b, c}, X2 = {x, y, z}, 7T 1(1) = a, 
7T 1(2) = b, and so on. Let w(X 2; 7T 1, 7T 2) denote the sophisticated voting outcome 
associated with the two-stage procedure (X2; 7T 1, 7T 2). 
In the "voting tree" characterization of this procedure, let CT(l) = 2 m ,- I be 
the number of decision nodes immediately following consideration of the alter-
natives in X 1, and let A. 1, >.. 2 , ••• , >-uo) denote these decision nodes. Each of the 
subtrees f(A.J beginning at these nodes will itself be an amendment procedure 
with agenda of the form 7T~(A;) = (7Ti(l), 7Ti(2), ... , 1Ti{m 2), p(A.;)), where 
p(A.;) is the remaining alternative from X 1 associated with the subtree. For ex-
ample, in the two-stage procedure described in Figure 2, 7T~(A. 1 ) = (x, y, z, a), 
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FIGURE 2 
A Two-Stage Amendment Procedure 
a c 
x a z ay a z ax c z cy c z ex b z by b z bx c z cy c z c 
7Ti(A 2) = (x, y, z, c), and so on. Thus, s(A;), the sophisticated equivalent out-
come associated with the node A;, will be equal to v(X2 U {p(A;)},1T~(A;)), where 
recall v(., ·) gives the sophisticated voting outcome for an amendment procedure. 
Let f, =(As, Qs; tfls) be the binary voting tree derived by replacing the subtrees 
f(A;) defined above with their sophisticated equivalent outcomes. Since X 1 was 
itself voted on via an amendment procedure, and the ordering 1T 2 is not a function 
of the history of the votes on X 1, in general it must be the case that 
f(>- 2) = f(A 4) = f(>- 6) = · · · = f(Au< 1>) 
f(A 3) = f(>- 7) = f(A 11 ) = · · · 
f(>. 5) = f(>. 13) = · · · 
f(>. 9) = f(>-2s) = · · · 
and so forth. 
Since equivalent subtrees give rise to the same sophisticated voting outcomes, 
replacing the nodes A 1, •.• , A u<n with their sophisticated equivalent alter-
natives implies that 
l/Ji>-2) = l/J,{A4) = · · · 
l/Js{A3) = l/li>-1) = · · · 
l/Ji>-s) = l/Js(An) = · · · 
and so forth. 
That is, the voting game f swill itself have the form of an amendment procedure 
with associated ordering 1T s = ( 1T ,(1), 1T ,(2), . . . , 1T s< m 1)) defined by 
1Ts(l) = l/Js(A 1) 
1Ts(m1) = l/JiA2) 
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7T,(m1 - 1) = tfl,(A.3) 
7T,(m1 - 2) = tfl,(A.5) 
1T ,(2) = tfl ,(A. (<T(l)/2)+ 1). 
Jeffrey S. Banks 
For the example in Figure 2, then, the majority preference relation described in 
Figure 1 implies that tfls(A 1) = x, tfl,(A. 2) = !/J,(A. 4) = y, and tfls(A. 3) = z, so that 
the resulting game f, is as described in Figure 3. 
In general there is of course the possibility of redundancies in the order 1T s; 
that is, 1T ,(i) = 1T ,(j), some i of- j. However, by the algorithm of Shepsle and 
Weingast in the preceding section, this can be remedied by simply removing 1T ,(i) 
if i < j or 1T ,(j) if j < i, creating an agenda of length less than m 1• Thus, given a 
partition X 1 and X 2 of X and orderings 1T 1 and 1T 2 , one can calculate the sophisti-
cated voting outcome w(X 2 ; 1T 1, 1T 2) by initially creating a first-order sophisti-
cated agenda y(X2; 7T 1, 7T 2) = {y 1(-), yz(-), . .. , Ym 1(-)), defined by y1(X 2; 7T 1, 
7T 2) = v(X2 U {7r 1(i)}, 7T~(7T 1 (i))), where 7T~(·) is defined as above. Applying the 
algorithm of Shepsle and Weingast to the agenda y( ·) to generate the agenda 
z(y( • )), we get, 
THEOREM 6: For all X2 E il(X) and (7T 1, 7T2) E Il(X1) X Il(X2), 
w(X2, 7T1, 7T2) = Z1(y(X2; 7T1, 7T2)). 
In Figure 2, y( ·) = ( x, z, y), so that the sophisticated voting outcome of this two-
stage procedure is z. Thus, for two-stage amendment procedures there exists an 
algorithm for calculating the sophisticated voting outcome analogous to the pro-
cess developed by Shepsle and Weingast for solving the (one-stage) amendment 
procedures. One-stage amendment procedures necessitate the use of the Shepsle 
and Weingast algorithm on one agenda of length m, while two-stage procedures 
require solving m 1 agendas of length m 2 + 1 and one agenda of length (at 
most) m 1• 
As in the preceding section, we are interested in characterizing the set of 
alternatives that constitutes the "possibility set" when a two-stage amendment 
procedure is employed to reach a collective decision. Let S 2(X) be the set of al-
ternatives which are sophisticated voting outcomes under some partition of X and 
some ordering of the elements of the partition. By Theorem 6 it is clear that alter-
natives in S 2(X) have the property that they are also in S 1(X') for some specific 
set X' C X. The set X' is the set of sophisticated voting outcomes derived from 
the subtrees defined by X 2 and 1T 2, while the order in which they are placed in the 
agenda y(·) is defined by 7T 1. Given X2, 7T2, define 
R(X 2; 7T2) = U {v(X2 U {x}, 7T~(x))}. 
xEX 1 
THEOREM 7: x E S2(X) iff 3 X2 E il(X), 1T2 E Il(X2) such that 
x E S1(R(X2; 7T 2)). 
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FIGURE 3 
The Reduced Voting Game Derived from Figure 2 
x y z y 
PROOF: (1) (nee.) By Theorem 6, 
m, 
R(X2; 7T 2) = U {y;(X2; 1T1> 7T2)}; 
i=l 
thus the result follows from Theorem 4. (2) (suff.) Let IR(X2; 7T 2)1 = m" and let 
1T x E Il(R(X 2; 1T 2)) be an agenda on R(X 2; 1T 2) such that x is the sophisticated 
voting outcome. We construct an order on the set X 1 as follows: V b E R(X 2 ; 1T 2) 
n X2, define A(B) ={a EX 1 : v(X2 U {a}, 1T;(a)) = b}, and let a(b) be a selec-
tion from A(b). For 0 ~ j ~ m, - I, define 
1T(m -·)={7T/m,-j) if 7T/m,-j)EX1} 
I I } a(1T x(m, - j)) else. 
Order the remaining alternatives from X 1 in any fashion from I to m 1 - m ,. 
Then, in the first-order equivalent agenda (Ym,-m,+1> ... , Ym) = (7T /I), 1T x(2), 
. . . , 1T x( m ,) ) , and by definition of the set R( ·) all remaining alternatives in y are 
equal to some alternative in 1T x- Thus, by Theorem 6 the sophisticated voting 
outcome will be x. QED. 
COROLLARY 1: {x} = S 2(X) iff P(x) = <f>. 
PROOF: (1) (nee.) Suppose not; let yPx and put x E X1, y E X2. Then x e 
R(X2; 7T 2) for any 7T 2. Contradiction. (2) (suff.) V X 2, 1T 2, x E R(X2; 7T 2); 
further, xPy, Vy E R(X2; 7T 2), y =F x. Thus {x} = S 1(R(X2; 7T 2)). QED. 
The characterization in Theorem 7 does not by itself provide much in the 
way of an intuitive "feel" for the set S2(X). However, the following results show 
that Theorem 7 can be used to generate necessary and sufficient conditions for an 
alternative to be in S 2(X), where these conditions themselves provide interesting 
contrasts to other solution concepts. 
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THEOREM 8: x E S2(X) if (1) x E U(X), or (2) x E S 1(X'), where X'<f!Jm 
X\X' . 
PROOF: ( l) Set X 2 = P - 1(x) and let 1T 2 be an arbitrary ordering of X 2. Then 
clearly x = v(X2 U {x}, 7T~(x)), so that x E R(X2; 7T 2). Hence, by Theorems 
4 and 7, x E U(X) implies x E S 1(R(X 2; 1T 2)), which implies x E S2(X). 
(2) Set X 2 = X'; since X'<f/JX\X', R(X 2; 1T 2) C X', for any 1T 2. But since 
each y E X' defeats at least one alternative in X 1 = X\X' that no other 
defeats, it must be that X' C R(X 2; 1T 2) as well. Therefore, R(X 2; 1T 2) = X', 
for any 7T2, so that since x E S'(X'),the result follows. QED. 
COROLLARY 2: S 1(X) C S2(X). 
PROOF: Follows from Theorems 4 and 8. QED. 
Thus, the "possibility set" under a two-stage amendment procedure is larger (by 
inclusion) than that under a one-stage amendment procedure. Further, as with the 
set S '(X), if P(x) =I= <f> V x E X, then S2(X) contains at least three alternatives. 
An interesting feature of the two-stage amendment procedure is that one can 
analyze the "possiblity set" at the intermediate stage where the partition of X has 
been chosen but the ordering of the alternatives in each set has not. This also 
allows for more insight into the asymmetric positions of alternatives in the set X 1 
and those in X 2 and for the derivation of necessary conditions for an alternative 
to be in the set S2(X). Let T(X2) be the set of sophisticated voting outcomes for 
any orderings of the sets X 2 and X 1 = X\X 2. From the above definitions, then, 
THEOREM 9: For all x 2 E O(X), x E x I n T(X 2) only if ( l) {x}<f/JX 2 and (2) 
x E U(X). 
PROOF: (1) If 3 y E X2 such that yPx, then x e R(X 2; 7T2), v 7T2 E Il(X 2). 
(2) Suppose not; let yCx. By (1 ), then y E X 1• Since y<f!JP(x), x E R(X 2; 
1T 2) implies y E R(X 2; 1T 2). But then y covers x in the set R(X 2; 1T 2) as well, 
so that by Theorem 4, x e S 1(R(X2; 7T2)). Contradiction. QED. 
Thus, if an alternative is in the first set to be considered, it is necessary for 
that alternative to be both uncovered in X and majority preferred to every alter-
native in the second set if it is to be the equilibrium outcome. The logic of the 
latter condition is that the set X 1 consists of the set of "status quos" for the 
amendment agendas 7T~( ·) so that, as was shown at the end of the previous sec-
tion, these will be the sophisticated voting outcomes of their respective agendas 
only if they defeat all the other alternatives in the agenda. 
THEOREM 10: For all x 2 E !1(X), x E x 2 n T(X 2) only if (1) x 2®X I• 
(2) yCx for no y E X2, and (3) xPz, some z E X1• 
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PROOF: (1) Suppose not; then 3 y E X 1 such that y<}JJX 2 , and let Y denote 
the set of alternatives in X 1 for which this is true. Then Y C R(X 2; 1T 2), and 
V z E R(X 2; TT 2)\Y and y E Y, yPz. Thus z e U(R(X 2; TT 2)), so that by 
Theorem 4, S 1(R(X 2; 1T 2)) C Y C X 1• Contradiction. (2) If yCx, then by 
Theorems 4 and 6, x e R(X 2; 1T 2), V 1T 2 E Il(X 2). (3) If not then x e R(X 2; 
TT2), V TT 2 E Il(X2). QED. 
Alternatives in X 2 have a somewhat "easier" necessary condition to meet in 
that they only have to defeat some alternative in X 1 and not be covered by any 
other alternative in X 2• 
COROLLARY 3: x E S2(X) only if {x}<}JJ 3X\{x}. 
PROOF: If x = w(X 2; 1T 1, 1T 2) and x E X 1, then by Theorems 1 and 9. 2, 
{x}<}JJ 2X\{x}. If x E X2, then by Theorem 10.2, {x}<}JJ 2X2\{x}, and by Theo-
rem 10.1, X2<}JJX 1• QED. 
This result contrasts nicely with Theorems 1 and 4: if x E S 1(X), then x can 
reach every other alternative in at most two steps, while if x E S 2(X), x can reach 
every other alternative in at most three steps. 
COROLLARY 4: For all X2 E il(X), 
T(X) c{X 2 if X2<}JJX 1} 
2 
- X 1 else. 
PRooF: Follows from Theorems 9 and 10. QED. 
Thus, once the partition of the set X has been fixed, all of the sophisticated 
voting outcomes will be either in X 1 or X 2, regardless of the ordering of the alter-
natives. Note that so far we have been actually assuming that both a partition and 
an ordering of the elements of the partition have been chosen. Suppose now that 
a partition X', X\X' has been decided upon, but not whether X' = X 1 or X' = X 2• 
The following then gives a necessary condition for the set of sophisticated vot-
ing outcomes to be independent of the order in which the sets X' and X\X' are 
considered. 
COROLLARY 5: T(X') = T(X\X') only if (1) X'<}JJX\X' and - [X\X'<}JJX'] or 
(2) X\X'<}JJX' and - [X'<}JJX\X']. 
PRooF: Follows from Corollary 4. QED. 
Since the relation <}JJ is complete, the first part of (1) or the first part of (2) 
must hold. If neither condition holds, then all of the sophisticated voting out-
comes will be from the set of alternatives considered second. 
The above analysis has assumed no constraints on m 1 and m 2; that is, the 
size of the sets X 1 and X 2• It is possible however that in examining two-stage 
amendment agendas one should require that the sets X 1, X 2 and their related 
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orderings 1T 1, 1T 2 each nontrivially reduce the set of alternatives under considera-
tion. This then implies the restriction that m, > 1, i = 1, 2. Indeed, if either m 1 
= 1 or m 2 = 1, it is easy to see that the resulting procedure will be equivalent to 
an amendment procedure, so that the differentiation between the two procedures 
is lost. Adding the above restriction changes none of the preceding results except 
for Corollary 2; that is, it need not be the case that every equilibrium outcome in 
a one-stage amendment procedure is also an equilibrium outcome in a two-stage 
procedure. To see this, suppose that p- 1(x) = {y}, and p- 1(y) = X\{x, y}. Then 
x ES '(X) by the order 1T(m) = y, 1T(m - 1) = x, but x Ef S 2(X) under the above 
restriction. If x E X 1, then it must be that {y} = X 2, by Theorem 9, which 
implies m 2 = 1. If x E X 2, then by Theorem IO y E X 2 as well. But then zPx, 
V z E X 1, so that x Ef R(X 2; 1T 2), for any 1T 2 E Il(X 2), proving the claim. Thus, 
if one requires that each element of the partition contain at least two alternatives, 
the notion that a two-stage amendment procedure allows for more (by inclusion) 
alternatives to be in the possibility set than a one-stage amendment procedure 
does not hold. Without this restriction, however, we have, 
THEOREM 11: IflXI = m ~ 5, then S2(X) = S 1(X). 
PROOF: By Corollary 2, we need to show that S 2(X) C S 1(X). Let x E 
S 2(X), but x Ef S 1(X). By the discussion above we consider only m 1 = 2 or 
m 1 = 3, so suppose m 1 = 2. If x E X 1 for the procedure where x is the 
outcome, then by Theorem IO {x}'.2LJX 2 , and hence yPx, where {x, y} = X 1• 
Then y Ef R(X2; 1T 2) so 3 z E X2 such that zPy. Thus {x, z} E H(x) and 
{x, z}'.2LJX\{x, z}, which contradicts x Ef S'(X). If x E X2 , then by Theorem IO 
3wEX1 such that xPw; let {y, w} = X 1. Since IR(X 2; 1T 2)1 = 2, 3 z E X 2 
such that zPw and xPz. Then {x, y, z} E H(x), and zPw and either xPv or 
yPv, for v = X2 \{x, z}, so that x ES 1(X). If m 1 = 3, then {x}'.2LJX 2 ifx EX 1, 
so that { x, Xi} E H(x), since X 2 contains only two alternatives. Thus if x = 
w(X 2; 1T 1, 1T 2), then it must be that Vy EX 1 either xPy or zPy, some z EX 2 , 
so that x E S 1(X). If x EX 2 , then X 2 = { x, z}'.2LJX 1, so that if xPz then {x, z} 
E H(x) and if zPx then 3 w E X 1 such that xPw, and {x, w}'.2LJX\{x, w}, 
implying x E S'(X). QED. 
The example in Figure 2 shows that this bound is tight, since m = 6, but 
S 1(X) = X\{z}, while S2(X) = X. 
Two-Stage Conditional Amendment Procedures 
In the above analysis we saw that, since the alternatives in X 1 were voted on 
by an amendment procedure, it implied that the subtrees beginning with the first 
votes in X 2 were all amendment procedures with the additional feature that the 
agendas for these amendment procedures were identical except for the last alter-
native. Suppose now that we allowed the agenda on the set X2 be a function of 
the outcome of the voting on the set X 1, so that a procedure would be character-
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ized by X 2 E O(X), 1T 1 E Il(X 1), and a function 1T 2 : X 1 ~ Il(X 2) assigning to 
every possible outcome in X 1 an ordering of the set X 2; let II AX 2) be the set of 
such functions and w(X 2; 1T 1, 1T k)) be the sophisticated voting outcome for any 
two-stage conditional amendment procedure. For the subtrees beginning at X 2, 
the voting still follows an amendment procedure, but now the orderings of the 
alternatives in X 2 may differ. However, since the ordering of the set X 2 is a func-
tion only of the outcome of the vote in X 1 and not a function of the entire history 
of votes in X 1, the equivalences among the subtrees f(>.. ;), and hence their so-
phisticated equivalent outcomes, will still hold. Therefore, the binary voting tree 
r, obtained by replacing the subtrees with their sophisticated equivalent out-
comes will again be an amendment procedure. Thus, to compute the sophisti-
cated voting outcome for this two-stage conditional amendment procedure 
(X2; 7T 1, Tri(-)), an analogous process to the one used in the above section will 
apply. Define the first-order sophisticated agenda y(X 2; 1T 1, 1T k )) = (y k), 
yz(-), ... , Ym,(·)) by 
Y;(X2; 7T1, 7T2(·)) = v(X2 U {7r1(i)}, 7T;(7T1(i))), 
where now 7T~(7T 1 (i)) = (7T 2(1; 7T 1(i)), 7T2(2; 7T1(i)), ... , 1T2(m2; Tr,(i)), 7T1(i)) 
and v( ·) is the sophisticated voting outcome associated with the set and order 
which are its arguments. Applying the Shepsle and Weingast algorithm z(y( ·)) to 
the agenda y(·), then, the equivalence theorem for this procedure becomes 
THEOREM 12: For all X2 E O(X), 7T1 E Il(X1), 7T2(·) E IIAX2), 
w(X2; 7T1, 7T2(·)) = Z1(y(X2; 7T1, 7T2(·)). 
As with two-stage amendment procedures, one needs to solve for m 1 agendas of 
length m 2 + I and one agenda of length at most m 1 to calculate the sophisticated 
voting outcome for two-stage conditional amendment procedures. 
Allowing the order on the set X 2 to vary across the outcomes of the X 1 votes 
implies that alternatives in the set S~(X) of alternatives which are sophisticated 
voting outcomes of some two-stage conditional amendment agenda also are in 
S 1(X') for some X' C X, as before, where now the set X' can be derived from 
different orderings on the set X2 • For any X2 , Tri(-), define 
R(X2; Tri(-))= U {v(X2 U {x}; 7T;(x))}. 
xEX1 
As in the above section, this is the set of alternatives in the first-order sophisti-
cated agenda. In the statement of a characterization theorem analogous to that of 
Theorem 7, however, the ability to choose a different ordering of X 2 for different 
alternatives in X 1 implies that the set R( ·) can include an alternative which is the 
equilibrium outcome for some x E X 1 and some agenda on X 2 U {x} where x = 
7T 2(m 2 + 1). This then implies that the characterization of the set S~(X) can be 
generated without reference to an ordering 1T 2, in contrast to the characterization 
of the set S2(X). 
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THEOREM 13: x E S~(X) iff 3 X2 E il(X) s.t. x E S 1 
( U S'(X2 U {x}; x)). 
xEX1 
The proof of Theorem 13 follows an analogous logic to that of Theorem 7 and is 
omitted. An immediate result is, 
COROLLARY 6: S2(X) C S~(X). 
Thus, the sufficient conditions given in Theorem 8 will also hold for the set 
S~(X). Furthermore, the necessary conditions in Theorems 9 and IO will be nec-
essary conditions for the set S~(X) as well, since none of these conditions were 
functions of orderings of the set X 2. Hence, we state the following results with-
out proof. Define 
Tc(X2) = U {w(X2; Tr,, 7rz{-))} 
1T1,1T2(·) 
as the set of equilibrium outcomes for a fixed partition X 2, X 1 = X\X 2. 
THEOREM 14: For any x 2 E il(X)' x E x I n Tc(X 2) only if ( 1) { x}'.2LJX 2 and 
(2) x E U(X). 
THEOREM 15: For any X2 E il(X), x E X2 n Tc(X 2) only if (1) X 2'.2llX 1; 
(2) yCx for no y E X2; and (3) xPz for some z E X 1• 
In relation to the set S2(X), we have the following analogous result to that of 
Theorem 11. 
THEOREM 16: If 1x1 ~ 5, then S2(X) = S~(X). 
PROOF: By Corollary 6 we need to show S~(X) C S2(X), so let x = w(X 2; Tr 1, 
Tr k)). If m 1 = 1 or 4, then the result follows trivially, so let m 1 = 3. If x E 
X 1 then {x}'.2LJX2, so that Ir/ Tr 2(·) 3YCX 1 such that Y C R(X 2; Trz(·)) and 
yPz, Ir/ y E Yand z E R(·)\Y, where x E Y. Thus the outcome will not be a 
FIGURE 4 
A Majority Preference Relation Where S2(X) C S~(X) 
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FIGURE 5 
A Two-Stage Conditional Amendment Procedure 
a b c b 
z a y ax a y ay b z bx b z by c z ex c z cy b z bx b z b 
function of 1T k). If x E X 2, then X 2 == {x, z}2llX 1, so that setting 1T 2 equals 
to the ordering 1T 2( ·) which implies x E R( ·) will imply x = w(X 2; 1T 1, 1T 2). 
If m 1 = 2, then again if x E X 1 the result follows, while if x E X 2, then X 2 
== {x, y, z}2ll{a, b} == X 1, and let xPa, yPb, xPy, and {x, y} = R(X 2; 1T i(-)). 
If xPz or yPz, then by defining X'1 = X 1 U { z} and setting 1T 2 equal to the 
ordering which implies x E R(·), the result follows for x; = {x, y}. If 
zPx and zPy, then {x, y} = R(·) implies aPz and bPz, so that again setting 
1T 2 equal to the above ordering implies x = w(X 2; 1T 1, 1T 2), so that x E 
S2(X). QED. 
To see that the bound in the above theorem is tight, consider the majority 
preference relation given in Figure 4. We see that S 1(X) = {c, z, y}, and that 
cCx. Suppose that x E S2(X); by Theorem 9, then x E X2 if x = w(X 2; 1T 1, 1T 2), 
and by Theorem 10, it must be that c EX 1 and z EX 2• Further, if z EX 2 then 
y E X2 as well, since if not, then R(X 2; 1T 2) = {x, z} and zPx, so that x of:. 
w(X2; 1T 1, 1T 2). So suppose X, ={a, b, c} and X 2 = {x, y, z}, and let 'IT; be the 
ordering which gives x = v(X2 U {a}, 1T;). Then it must be that 1T;(3) = y, since 
otherwise x would not be the outcome. But then z = v(X 2 U {i}, 1T~) for i = b, c, 
so that {x, z} = R(X2; 1T 2), implying that x of:. w(X 2; 1T 1, 1T 2) and x rE. S 2(X). 
Further, any other partition of X will suffer from a similar drawback. However, x 
is in S~(X) by the following: X 1 ={a, b, c}, X 2 = {x, y, z}, 1Tz{a) = (z, x, y), 
1T 2(b) = (x, y, z) = 1Tz{c), and 1T 1 = (a, c, b); see Figure 5. To see that x = 
w(X 2; 1T 1, 1T k )), note that now x = v(X 2 U {a}, 1T 2(a)), y = v(X 2 U {b}, 1T z(b)), 
and z = v(X 2 U {c}, 1T 2(c)), and that by Theorem 12 the first-order sophisticated 
agenda is (x, z, y). Thus, since yPz and xPy, xis the equilibrium outcome for this 
two-stage conditional amendment procedure. 
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Conclusion 
This paper has analyzed the two-stage amendment procedure as a method 
for solving collective choice problems in voting bodies such as Congress. The 
main results of the paper are as follows: 
1. There exists a well-defined algorithm for computing the sophisticated 
voting outcome for any two-stage amendment procedure. This algorithm is based 
on that developed by Shepsle and Weingast (1984) for the one-stage amendment 
procedure. 
2. The set of possible outcomes under a two-stage amendment procedure is 
larger (by inclusion) than that under a one-stage amendment procedure. That is, 
in congressional parlance, an alternative that might not have been an outcome 
when all such alternatives are in the form of amendments to an original bill (or 
the bill itself) might now be the outcome when the alternatives are divided into 
two groups, namely those referring to the original bill and those referring to a 
substitute bill. 
3. It is "easier" for alternatives considered in the second stage to become 
the final outcome than it is for alternatives in the first stage. This result is related 
to congressional decision making by the rule specifying the perfection of the 
original bill prior to the perfection of any substitute bill. Thus, in the language of 
the above analysis, the original bill and its amendments are X 1 and the substitute 
bill and its amendments are X 2 . The analysis above has shown that the conditions 
for an alternative considered as a substitute bill or one of its amendments to be 
the final outcome are weaker than those for the original bill or one of its amend-
ments. This would seem to give a strategic advantage to those who propose and 
amend the substitute bills. A clue to the identity of these actors can be found in 
Bach (1983), where he notes that "most of the amendments in the nature of sub-
stitutes [i.e., substitute bills] offered in the Senate are committee amendments" 
(Bach, 1983, p. 586). Indeed, in the example cited at the beginning of the paper, 
the Committee on Veterans' Affairs reported both a bill and a substitute bill to the 
floor of the Senate. This then provides further evidence of the relative power of 
committees in their substantive domain. 
One of the restrictive assumptions in the above model of voting procedures 
is that the set of alternatives is fixed prior to any decisions on agendas. Thus, 
future work will focus on the endogenous determination of alternatives, given 
that the two-stage amendment procedure will be employed, in much the same 
way Shepsle and Weingast (1984), Austen-Smith (1986), and Banks and Gasmi 
(1987) analyze endogenous agenda formation in the one-stage amendment proce-
dure. The results in the current paper will obviously form the backbone of any 
such analysis, for to determine which alternatives should be placed on the agenda 
one must be able to solve for the eventual outcome for any such alternative. An-
other restriction to be relaxed in future work was that substitute amendments 
were not themselves the target of amendments; that is, decisions subsequent to 
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the adoption of Rule 19 in the House allow there to be a bill, an amendment, 
an amended amendment, a substitute amendment, and an amended substitute 
amendment, along with the same possibilities related to a substitute bill. Specifi-
cation of such a procedure would involve again a partition of the alternatives and 
orders on each element of the partition, but would also include a description of 
the order in which the alternatives resulting from the votes on the subsets are 
voted. For example, if there are three subsets of alternatives, two referring to the 
original bill and the remaining subset referring to a substitute bill, then the result-
ing alternatives from the first two subsets should be paired off prior to considera-
tion of the third, while if two subsets refer to the substitute, the resulting alter-
native from the perfecting of the original bill (i.e., from the first subset) would 
wait until the winners from the remaining subsets are paired off (Sullivan, 1984; 
Bach, 1983). This added parameter in the procedure will doubtless complicate 
extensions of the current analysis; however, its relevance to the "real world" of 
congressional decision making would make such a task worthwhile. 
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